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Abstract 
This paper re-examines Hyperides’ speech In Defence of Euxenippus as evidence for the role of 
divination in fourth-century BCE Athens. The oration recounts an occasion of oracular 
divination through incubation at Amphiaraos’ sanctuary in Oropos, whereby the Athenian 
Assembly ordered individuals to undergo incubation to resolve an issue concerning land 
ownership. This paper argues that Hyperides’ speech not only furnishes crucial evidence 
which broadens our understanding of divination beyond the famous oracle at Delphi, it also 
provides us with a valuable case study for the process of oracular consultation. The paper 
analyses the different stages of this process, including the selection of incubants, the nature 
of the dream received and the aftermath of incubation, demonstrating how the dream could 
be contested. It thereby sheds new light on the complexities of oracular transmission and 
interpretation, both of which are open to contestation as a result of the multiplicity of 
religious authority. 
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Some time in the late 330s or early 320s BCE, a dispute arose over ownership of a hill near 
Oropos, a territory near the border of Boeotia and Attica.1 Oropos had recently been restored 
to Athenian control, most likely by Alexander in 335, and the Athenian Assembly had 
subsequently divided the five hills surrounding Oropos into lots and allocated them to the 
ten Athenian tribes in groups of two, as a speech by the orator Hyperides recounts (Hyp. 
                                               
1 Control of Oropos was repeatedly disputed in the fifth and fourth centuries: it is thought to have first been settled by 
Eretria in Euboea, before swinging between Theban and Athenian control. Oropos was used by the Athenians as a naval base 
during the Persian Wars (Hdt. 6.100-101) and remained in Athenian hands until 411 BCE (Thuc. 2.23.3). Thebes then regained 
control but by 371 Athens had recovered it, before losing the territory again in 366: see Cosmopoulos (2001), 14-16 for a 
brief overview of the territory’s history. 
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4.16).2 A dispute arose, however, about one particular hill, appointed to the tribes 
Hippothoönthis and Acamantis: it was claimed this land actually belonged to the god 
Amphiaraos, whose sanctuary stood in Oropos, and that the hill was thus unlawfully 
allocated to the two tribes. In order to resolve this conflict the Assembly of Athens decided 
to send a group of men to Amphiaraos’ sanctuary to undergo incubation and ask the god 
himself for his opinion on the matter. A question of land ownership therefore became, as this 
article will show, one of competing oracular interpretations. 
The orator Hyperides recounts these events in his speech In Defence of Euxenippus 
(Hyp. 4)  written for Euxenippus Ethelokratous of Lamptrai, who was one of the incubants in 
the affair. The speech is unusual and exceptional: it is the only oration preserved from 
classical Athens which discusses an instance of oracular divination by way of a dream. 
Moreover, this oracular enquiry does not present the god with a therapeutic request, as is 
customary at Amphiaraos’ Oropian sanctuary in the fourth century, but rather submits to 
the god a question of public decision-making.3 Divination in the ancient Greek world 
constituted an assemblage of techniques and methods used to seek the counsel of the gods. 
The most prestigious form of divination in the classical period was oracular, which itself 
existed in various forms, whether functioning through dreams - as in the case of Oropos - or 
prophets.4 The affair of Euxenippus itself raises a number of intriguing questions regarding 
the role of oracles in public decision-making, which forces us to rethink the usual picture of 
oracular divination, built up as it is largely from sources concerning the more famous oracle 
of Apollo at Delphi. Why did the Athenians decide to consult the oracle here with a question 
of land allocation? How did oracular consultation through incubation, usually employed for 
individual, therapeutic consultations, work with regards to a collective, public issue which 
involved two of the city’s tribes? And, most significantly, what does this rare source for the 
process of oracular consultation tell us about how authority was negotiated in this public 
decision-making process, in which a divine dream undergoes human transmission and 
multiple interpretations, in order to become a decision-making tool in a matter of land 
allocation?  
This paper offers a re-examination of Hyperides’ speech In Defence of Euxenippus, 
which intends to both deconstruct the oracular case at its heart and contextualise the speech 
as a source for the role of divination in the public life of classical Athens. Of course, the 
exceptionality of the case means we cannot automatically or unquestioningly regard it as 
                                               
2 Traditionally the restoration of Oropos had been attributed to Philip II in 338 (on basis of Paus. 1.34.1 and [Dem.] 9). 
Recently however Knoepfler’s assignment of this restoration to Alexander in 335 has become accepted: see Knoepfler (2001), 
367-389.  
3 The only other references to dreams of any kind in Attic oratory are a tale of Helen visiting Homer in a dream in Isocrates’ 
Helen (Isoc. 10.65) and two accusations against Demosthenes by Aeschines: Aeschin. 2.10 alleges that Demosthenes in his 
prosecution speech told a story about a dream of a priestess in Sicily – this is not preserved in Demosthenes’ On the False 
Embassy though. In the second accusation Aeschines accuses Demosthenes of, upon hearing the news of Philip’s death, 
pretending he had received this news directly from Athena and Zeus in a dream (Aeschin. 3.77, 219). 
4 On Greek divination in general, see Johnston (2008); Beerden (2003); Johnston and Struck (2005). 
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representative of general oracular practice. Furthermore, the use of the speech as a source 
is made complex by the rhetorical nature of Hyperides’ oration: his narrative evidently 
shapes and constructs events in such a way as to best substantiate his argument of defence 
in Euxenippus’ impeachment trial. Nonetheless, if we proceed with caution and awareness 
of both the case’s singularity and of the rhetorical nature of the depiction found in 
Hyperides’ speech, the affair of Euxenippus can illuminate certain aspects of the divinatory 
process which remain largely hidden in other sources. Hyperides’ speech affords us a 
valuable rare glimpse into the process of how divine signs were employed by presenting the 
different stages involved: from the type of issue which requires oracular advice to the 
decision to consult the oracle, from the functioning of the divinatory consultation itself to 
the subsequent interpretation of the sign and the final resolution of the problem. Yet this 
process and its results have not received the attention they deserve: general studies of 
divination largely ignore Euxenippus’ case.5 The few scholars who have examined it, 
meanwhile, limit themselves primarily to the question of purpose: they merely weigh up the 
political, economic or religious considerations which affected why the Athenians here 
decided to consult the oracle, but they do not go far beyond this reason for the consultation.6 
In contrast, this paper sets out to explore the important ignored issues of the functioning of 
the oracle and its consequences, investigating how divination is here actually used for 
conflict resolution.  
As divination provided the ancient Greeks with the most direct means of accessing 
indications of the will of their gods, the role of oracles in Athenian life has long been an 
object of study and has functioned as a cornerstone of the wider debate on the role of religion 
in Athenian democracy. Scholarship on ‘official’ oracular divination, the consultation of 
oracles by officials or city states, in matters concerning public, political or military affairs, 
has focused largely on Apollo’s oracle at Delphi, for which we have the most evidence, both 
literary and epigraphic.7 Recently, the publication of the lead inscriptions from the oracle at 
Dodona has opened up the debate somewhat beyond Delphi.8 Yet the nature of the Dodonian 
oracular questions, sustaining and sustained by a growing scholarly interest in the role of 
the individual in religion, has been very much geared towards recognising the  importance 
                                               
5 Martin (2009) does not discuss the speech or its dream, nor do the general studies of divination of Beerden (2013) and 
Trampedach (2015), who furthermore make no mention of the oracular cult of Amphiaraos at all. Flower (2008), which 
focuses on seers, discusses Amphiaraos in his role as mantis in Aeschylean tragedy but does not refer to his oracular cult. 
Johnston (2008), 90-95 discusses Amphiaraos’ cult but presents it as a healing cult and does not mention the evidence, such 
as Hyperides’ speech, which describes the cult’s oracular function too. Remarkably, the case is only referenced in a short 
footnote in Näf (2004), 53, a monograph dealing with dreams and their meaning in the ancient world and which dedicates 
two chapters to dreams in classical Greece.  
6 Harris (2009), 157; Engels (1989), 222-238; Papazarkadas (2011), 44-45, 102-106; Renberg (2017), 311. 
7 See e.g. Bowden (2005); Parker (2005), 89-115. 
8 Rosenberger (2013); Eidinow (2007); Lhôte (2007).  
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of divination in private everyday life.9 With regards to divination in public discourse, in the 
political and legal decision-making of Athens, Delphi still rules the roost. Scholars have 
concentrated on the question of the function of official consultations: from early-twentieth-
century attitudes which derided oracular divination as charlatanism or mere formalities, 
theories have evidently moved on to focus on the role of divination in its social setting, or as 
a lens through which to view the mentalities of cultures which make use of such practices.10 
Public divination has come to be seen as a regulatory device, used to gain consensus in 
situations where this is lacking, or – taking it more seriously – as a way of dealing with 
contingency and risk.11 This paper aims to throw new light on the subject of Greek public 
divination by examining a source – and oracle – neglected in this regard, proposing an 
alternative way of interpreting the function of oracular consultations. 
Who eventually makes the decision regarding the disputed land in Oropos, and how 
do they do so? This study sets out to answer this question by paying attention to the different 
actors involved in the decision-making process, their assigned roles, and their authority. 
After a short introduction to the speech itself, the analysis will deconstruct the different 
stages of the oracular consultation. It will commence, first, with the Assembly’s decision to 
consult the oracle, paying particular attention to the selection and identity of the incubants. 
Second, it will move on to Oropos and the incubation rite itself, scrutinising the way in which 
the nature of the dream is experienced and articulated by the dreamer. As Hyperides’ 
account of the events leading up to the court case are rather confused, it will be necessary 
here to attempt to reconstruct the details of the speech’s narrative, in particular to clarify 
the content of the dream and its relationship to the subsequent trial. The third section of 
this paper will put Euxenippus’ dream in a wider context by surveying comparable evidence 
for oneiromancy in the Greek world. The final section will examine the aftermath of the 
consultation, which constitutes the stage of the oracle’s interpretation. It will demonstrate 
how contested this interpretation of the dream was, as expressed through the discussion of 
the Assembly upon Euxenippus’ return, the decree proposal which a man called Polyeuctus 
made regarding the dream, and Polyeuctus’ subsequent prosecution of the dreamer 
Euxenippus. This analysis will therefore provide an investigation into the different agents 
                                               
9 Mikalson (1983), 48; Harris (2009), 155-156. But contra Bonnechère (2010), 156-158 who recognises this distinction can be 
moderated.  
10 For an overview of early twentieth-century scholarship see Johnston (2005), 1-10; Beerden (2013), 9-18. 
11 The first approach: Morgan (1989) sees it as a tool for promoting political and social stability, as a way of dealing with 
difference and disagreement. Arnush (2005) subscribes to this too. He makes the separation between religious and ‘political’ 
consultations too strong: see especially 101. Bonnechère (2010) challenges the political reading such an approach can lead 
to, in which oracles are considered simply tools for the Greek states or its leaders which give the appearance of external 
authority.  Nonetheless Bonnechère similarly characterises the function of oracles – in this article specifically double 
oracular consultations – as a way for consultants to guarantee their course of action is seen as respectable and enlightened. 
On the second approach see Bowden (2005); Eidinow (2007). Also Rüpke (2013) who sees divination as a way of dealing with 
uncertainty “which identifies and articulates consent and dissent by using certain social roles to interpret standardised 
signs and to ritually deal with them. In such a performance a specific appropriation of social roles and religious traditions 
is indicated.” (9). 
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invested with authority in this decision-making process - the god, the demos, and various 
individuals - as well as the challenges made to different holders of authority throughout the 
whole process.  
 
1. Hyperides’ oration 
 
The story of disputed Oropian land and of the ensuing dream which Hyperides recounts in 
his speech In Defence of Euxenippus is an incomplete one, the narrative riddled by significant 
uncertainties. What exactly happened at the sanctuary at Oropos and, more significantly 
perhaps, what exactly happened upon the incubants’ return to Athens is not straightforward 
to ascertain, as Hyperides does not give a full narrative of the events. It will be useful to 
introduce here first the facts which the speech does report, before examining briefly how 
the holes in the narrative may be explained by looking at the place of this oration within the 
trial it forms part of.   
After the land dispute arose and the Assembly sent three men to incubate in Oropos, 
Euxenippus reported to the Assembly the dream he had experienced there (Hyp. 4.14). The 
content of the dream is unclear, yet what we know is that a man called Polyeuctus 
subsequently proposed a decree requiring the two tribes to return the land to the god 
Amphiaraos and the remaining eight tribes to provide compensation to Hippothoönthis and 
Acamantis for their loss of land and revenue (Hyp. 4.15). This proposal, however, was 
considered to contravene existing laws, as Polyeuctus was convicted for proposing an illegal 
decree after a successful γραφή παρανόμων (‘prosecution for illegalities’) was brought 
against him (Hyp. 4.16). He did not give up on the issue and subsequently brought a charge 
of bribery by εἰσαγγελία (impeachment) against Euxenippus, alleging that the latter had 
accepted bribes for his report of the dream.12 The trial came to court between 330 and 324 
BCE, and Hyperides’ oration, delivered by the orator himself, defends Euxenippus from this 
charge.13 The outcome of the trial is unknown.  
That Hyperides’ narration of the actual events preceding the trial is limited could be 
explained by the fact that the oration is a συνηγορία, a speech delivered by a supporting 
speaker after the main litigant had already presented his case.14 The majority of Hyperides’ 
speech is consequently taken up by two lines of argument not directly related to the central 
narrative. The first is a procedural one, as Hyperides starts his defence by arguing that the 
prosecutor Polyeuctus is abusing the procedure of εἰσαγγελία and that it is inappropriate for 
                                               
12 The εἰσαγγελία is n. 124 in Hansen (1975). For the working of the procedure see Hansen (1975), esp. 21-28. 
13 Whitehead (2000), 157 and Cooper (2001), 103 think an early date within this period is most likely. 
14 This is established by a reference Hyperides makes in the oration itself to a previous speaker: ὅπερ ὁ πρότερος ἐμοῦ λέγων 
εἶπεν (…) (Hyp. 4.15). Babington (1853), xv, who first identified the speech as Hyperides’ in 1853, already argued for its 
identity as ‘logos sunegoros’. For a detailed study of συνήγοροι see Rubinstein (2000), 17 who suggests there may have been 
multiple συνήγοροι in this case. 
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a charge of this type (Hyp. 4.1-9, 27-30).15 He contends that the section of the impeachment 
law which covers bribes applies not to all Athenians, but only to ῥήτορες, and that it is thus 
not applicable to Euxenippus, whom he portrays as an ἰδιώτης, a private citizen, in no way a 
public political figure (7-9, 27-30). We will return to the question of how accurate this 
representation of Euxenippus as ἰδιώτης really is. The second key line of argument the 
speech presents is an argument of relevance, as Hyperides refutes the relevance of additional 
charges made by the prosecution against his defendant (19-26: charge of pro-Macedonian 
sympathies, 31-37: implicit accusation of having amassed great wealth dishonestly).  Only in 
paragraphs 14-18 does Hyperides discuss the actual indictment for bribery brought against 
Euxenippus. His narrative does not recount the content of the dream, nor do we find out 
what report Euxenippus then made to the Assembly, or what debate this generated. 
Presumably these details would have already been discussed both by the prosecution and by 
the first speaker for the defence.16 However, these missing elements, central as they are to 
the whole case, make it very difficult to build up a coherent and complete picture of the case: 
as it is, scholars disagree on its basic details.17 We are not even sure, for example, whether 
Euxenippus’ dream was understood as supporting the claim of the god, or that of the two 
tribes. In this article’s analysis of the use of the oracle as a source of authority and its role in 
this legal decision-making process, it will thus also be necessary to attempt to reconstruct 
an outline of the basic details of the case from this narrative section of the speech.   
 
2. Who dreams for the demos? 
 
To commence the analysis of the oracular consultation the first point to consider is the 
decision to consult the oracle. Hyperides starts his narrative of events by stating that: 
the people ordered (ὁ δῆμος προσέταξεν) Euxenippus, as one of three (τρίτῳ αὐτῷ), 
to lie down in the temple; and he tells us that he fell asleep and saw (ἰδεῖν) a dream 
(ἐνύπνιόν) which he reported to them. (Hyp. 4.14)18 
                                               
15 On the reconstruction of the εἰσαγγελία law based largely on this passage, see MacDowell (1978), 184-186; Hansen (1975), 
12-20. Hyperides makes a very similar argument in his speech In Defence of Lykophron: Hyp. 1.8-12. Cf. Whitehead (2000), 158, 
who analyses the similarity in strategies and notes that in both cases the orator attempts to create a “conceptual gulf” 
between procedures designed to hold public figures to account, and the character of the defendant as a private individual.  
16 As Whitehead (2000), 201 points out. 
17 For example, the basic chronology of events as presented here (oracle consultation is followed by Polyeuctus’ decree 
proposal, which in turn is followed by the εἰσαγγελία trial) is not even wholly accepted: Van Lieshout (1980), 176 and 
Horster (2004), 72 both construct a completely different narrative of these events, alleging that first Polyeuctus proposed 
his decree, then Euxenippus was ordered to consult the god, and Polyeuctus then disputed the dream by lodging the 
εἰσαγγελία charge. However, this chronology is illogical and does not accord at all with the narrative as Hyperides 
describes it. At paragraph 15, for example, he makes it explicit that the element which is “based on the dream” is the 
ψήφισμα, the decree, making it clear that the decree is posterior to the dream.    
18 The same verb προστάσσω is used here of the Athenians tasking Euxenippus with consulting the god, as well as of the god 
tasking Euxenippus with his message: ἃ ὁ θεὸς αὐτῷ προσέταττε ταῦτ᾽ ἐξαγγείλας πρὸς Ἀθηναίους (Hyp.4.14). See Whitehead 
(2000), 200. 
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According to the orator it is the Athenian people who made the decision to send incubants 
to Amphiaraos: Hyperides does not specify how exactly, but most probably this was 
accomplished through a decree of the Assembly, similar to how embassies or messengers 
were assigned their tasks to visit other states.19 The demos makes the choice of which 
resolution strategy to employ, and they elect to consult the oracle. The god, Amphiaraos, is 
seen as the ultimate authority; the oracle consultation, a technique to ascertain knowledge 
of the god’s will. Explaining the Assembly’s reasoning here has preoccupied most of the 
recent scholarship on the speech. William Harris, for example, in his study on dreams 
emphasises the personal involvement of the god as an explanation for the decision by the 
Athenian demos to consult the oracle.20 As the conflict concerns land potentially belonging 
to the god (or to his sanctuary), it would have made sense to attempt to obtain the god’s 
judgement in the matter. Nikolaos Papazarkadas, on the other hand, examines the case in 
economic terms, focusing on the financial exploitation of the land’s forest wealth, and 
thereby awards little attention to the religious dimension.21 Johannes Engels instead 
provides a political reading of the speech, seeing it primarily as a battle between two major 
Athenian politicians, with Hyperides on the defence opposite the politician Lykourgos on the 
side of the prosecution.22 While Engels may very well be overstating the role of the two 
politicians within the trial itself, the significance of the political climate is demonstrated by 
epigraphic evidence, which points to considerable attention awarded by Athens to Oropos in 
the 330s and 320s BCE.23 This case probably formed part of a protracted debate on the 
allotment and exploitation of land following Athens’ reacquisition of the territory of Oropos, 
as the evidence for another similar dispute surrounding land distribution in Oropos in the 
330s (Agora 16.84) indicates too.24  
                                               
19 See for example IG II2 31, an Athenian decree from 386/5 concerning Hebryzelmis, king of Odryssa, which denotes that 
three men shall be elected to take news to Hebryzelmis concerning the request of the envoys he himself sent. See also, for 
example, IG II2 43; IG I2 57; and for descriptions by the orators of the selection of embassies in the Assembly, see also for 
example Aeschin. 2.15; 2.17; Andoc. 2.35; Dem. 18.178.  
20 Harris (2009), 157; see also Renberg (2017), 311. 
21 Papazarkadas (2011), 44-45, 102-106. 
22 Engels (1989), 222-238. He goes so far as to suggest that Lykourgos encouraged Polyeuctus to bring the impeachment 
charge, though there is no evidence for this (228). 
23 A decree (I. Orop. 297 = IG II3 1 348) passed in 332/1 BCE proposing honours for Phanodemos of Thymaitadai tells us that 
he was involved with the recent reorganisation of a festival in honour of Amphiaraos, the Great Amphiareia – these were 
first held in 329/8 BCE, and modelled by the Athenians on the Great Panathenaea; Lykourgos was also involved: I. Orop. 298. 
Around this time a new fountain and drainage system were also installed at the Amphiareion: I Orop. 292, 295 concerns the 
fountain; I Orop. 347-60 are the dedications. See Papazarkadas (2011), 44 for discussion of these. At the same time as 
Phanodemos received honours, a decree was also passed – proposed by the same Phanodemos – proposing honours for the 
god Amphiaraos himself (I. Orop. 296 = IG II3 1 349). This decree is unique, as it is the only occasion we have of the Athenian 
assembly honouring and crowning a god (rather than a mortal): see Scafuro (2009), 59-86, who points out the similarities of 
this crowning to the honours Athens awarded to foreigners, and argues the crowning is both symbolic and political (77). 
This is a completely unparalleled practice, and can been taken as an indication of the importance awarded by Athens in the 
330s to its recently re-acquired territory at Oropos. On the relationship between Athens and Oropos in the early Hellenistic 
period see also Wilding (2015). 
24 See Papazarkadas (2009) on this inscription. 
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Political, economic and religious considerations therefore all had a role to play in the 
Athenians’ choice of strategy for this decision-making process. However, in focusing solely 
on explaining the reason for the consultation, these more recent readings overlook the 
intricacies of the decision-making process itself, and the mechanisms and strategies involved 
in trying to resolve this dispute of land allocation. They thereby ignore the remarkable value 
of the speech for our understanding of incubation and divination more generally. In order 
to contribute to this broader picture, this article will examine the steps which took place 
after the initial decision to enquire of the god. 
 The next such step is the choice of envoys sent to Oropos to undergo incubation on 
the city’s behalf. As the goal was to ask the god about the ownership of a particular hill, this 
is a case of what we may call divinatory incubation. In his recent study of incubation in the 
ancient world, Gil Renberg advocates for the importance of recognising a distinction 
between two types of incubation, which he calls ‘therapeutic’ and ‘divinatory’ respectively.25 
The first describes the practice of the sick and injured seeking medical attention at 
incubation sanctuaries, whereby the god would be expected to heal the incubants in their 
sleep or provide medical advice to them in their dreams. Divinatory incubation, on the other 
hand, concerns the practice of “seeking dreams about matters other than health concerns, 
either public or private”.26 In other words, it is an oracular consultation as found at Delphi 
or Dodona, but differs in terms of the mechanism through which the divine message is 
transmitted. Renberg’s terminology is helpful to distinguish between two practices which, 
while sharing many of the same logistics and characteristics, remain distinct in certain 
important respects.  
In addition, therapeutic incubation appears to develop later than the divinatory kind 
– only from the fourth century onwards – and appears to have had a larger and more popular 
base of consulters.27  Amphiaraos’ sanctuary at Oropos seems to have fulfilled both functions 
at various times. Amphiaraos, although of Argive origin, was a hero, at times a seer, 
connected to Thebes, as one of the mythical Seven Against Thebes (Aesch. Septem 569-619).28 
He is said to have been swallowed up by the earth during his escape from this battle before 
subsequently re-emerging as a god (Pindar, Olympian 6. 13-14; see also Pindar Nemean 9, 
Pythian 8). Early references to the hero indicate his cult and sanctuary was situated in Thebes: 
incubation took place here and, more specifically, of the divinatory kind (Hdt. 1.46-52; 8.133-
134). Amphiaraos’ cult, when situated at Thebes, appears to have provided divinatory 
                                               
25 Renberg (2017), 21-30. 
26 Renberg (2017), 21. 
27 Divinatory incubation is less well-attested than the therapeutic variety: see Renberg (2017), 310-328.  How far the sparser 
evidence and precedential timeframe of divinatory incubation is a reflection of reality, or rather the consequence of what 
sources have survived, cannot be determined with certainty.  
28 He is presented as a μάντις in Aeschylus’ play, as also in Eur. Phoenissae 173; 1111. On Amphiaraos and his portrayal in 
myth see Sineux (2007). 
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incubation.29 However, the cult somehow changed location or was transferred in the late fifth 
century, when sources start referring to the Amphiareion in Oropos, the site which 
Euxenippus consults a century later.30 Only once it is based in Oropos is therapeutic 
incubation attested for Amphiaraos’ cult and this became the principal type of incubation 
practiced at Oropos, though as Euxenippus’ consultation on behalf of the Athenian demos 
shows, the divinatory type did endure too. 
The vast majority of evidence for incubation concerns the therapeutic kind. There 
the incubant is mostly necessarily the person with the complaint or health issue him- or 
herself.31 Consequently, incubation is generally portrayed as a very personal experience, in 
which the incubant hopes to achieve direct contact with the deity. In this case from fourth-
century Athens, however, the incubant is a delegate enquiring about a collective matter and 
the selection of envoys to incubate on the city’s behalf is therefore an exceptional step in the 
incubation process. One might expect the identity of the incubant to be an issue of 
importance: would this position require a particular status or religious authority of some 
sort, or could anyone be sent? Furthermore, the issue is made even more noteworthy by the 
fact that not just one, but three individuals are sent to undergo divinatory incubation for the 
same purpose. This is, as Renberg points out, completely unparalleled in the ancient world.32 
It is therefore worth examining this selection of incubants more closely, which may illustrate 
what exactly the role of dreamer was understood to involve.  
As quoted above, Hyperides states that Euxenippus was sent “as one of three” 
(Εὐξενίππῳ τρίτῳ αὐτῷ) (Hyp. 4.14). Euxenippus’ two companions are not named, nor 
mentioned again in the rest of the speech. Could this differentiation between the named 
Euxenippus and his anonymous companions reflect a differentiation in their status or the 
manner in which they were chosen as members of the incubation party? Or is it simply a 
consequence of the fact that the two unidentified men are irrelevant to the impeachment 
case? In his commentary on the speech, David Whitehead builds upon Kenneth Dover’s study 
of the usage and meaning of the idiom ‘αὐτός + ordinal numeral’ to argue that this 
construction does not imply a hierarchy: “rather than implying that the other two members 
of the trio were formally subordinate to Euxenippus, it indicates that he is the only one 
whom the user of the phrase wished or needed to mention by name.”33 From Hyperides’ 
                                               
29 Hdt 1.46-52: Croesus consulted Amphiaraos’ oracular shrine as part of his test of the oracles. Herodotus also tells of a 
consultation in 479 BC by Mys, Mardonius’ agent (8.133-34). According to Hdt (8.134) Thebans themselves were not allowed 
to consult the oracle, after Amphiaraos told them to elect him as either their ally or their prophet – they chose the former. 
30 How or why the oracle came to move to Oropos is unclear: according to Strabo (9.2.10) it was moved on advice of the 
oracle, though it is also possible it was introduced at Oropos while still existing in Thebes: see Parker (1996), 146-149 and 
now Renberg (2017), 660-676. For the dating of the sanctuary’s foundation in Oropos to the late fifth century see 
Cosmopoulos (2001), 14. 
31 For a handful of exceptions to this, recorded on the Epidaurian inscriptions, see the references in n. 59 and 60. 
32 Renberg (2017), 311. He does suggest one possible parallel from Late Antique Egypt, though this is uncertain.  
33 Whitehead (2000), 200, who lists Dem. 18.16; Aeschin. 2.178; Isai. 7.38 and Din. 8 frg.2 as comparable passages in Attic 
oratory. For a list of the use of the idiom in other sources see Dover (1960), 70-71. 
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language itself it is thus not possible to make assumptions about the way in which the 
selection of incubants was made, nor does it suggest Euxenippus stood out from his two 
companions, other than in his relevance to Hyperides’ specific argument.  
However, this supposed parity and equality between the three incubants may be 
questioned, by re-examining, first, Hyperides’ portrayal of his defendant, and, secondly, by 
comparing this case with epigraphic evidence for how Athenians selected delegates in other 
cases. Not much is known about Euxenippus, save that he was a wealthy Athenian citizen 
who had acted as trierarch before 334/3 BC (IG II2 1623), and was elderly (Hyp. 4.13) by the 
time of his impeachment by Polyeuctus. Hyperides presents his defendant as much as 
possible as an ordinary citizen, an ἰδιώτης (13, 30). But this depiction is possibly misleading. 
As discussed above, it forms part of Hyperides’ discussion of the ἰδιώτης /ῥήτωρ distinction 
made in the εἰσαγγελία law and, in addition, his objection to the prosecution’s use of the 
impeachment procedure. It has long been recognised that ῥήτωρ is an imprecise term: while 
legally it referred to anyone who had ever addressed the Assembly – as Euxenippus had done 
at least once, in reporting his dream to the people – it is often used in a more precise sense 
to denote someone who played an active role in politics. It is in this latter sense that 
Hyperides talks about ῥήτορες (8, 9, 27).34 Considering its rhetorical value in the speech’s 
argumentation, one should evidently therefore not take Hyperides’ portrayal of Euxenippus 
as ἰδιώτης at face value.  
Moreover, another story mentioned in the defence speech actively challenges this 
portrait. Hyperides tells us that “Euxenippus allowed Olympias (ἐάσας Ὀλυμπιάδα) to 
dedicate a cup to the statue of Health (Ὑγιεία)” (Hyp. 4.19), as part of the refutation of 
accusations of pro-Macedonian sentiments with which the prosecution accuses 
Euxenippus.35 A statue to Hygieia is known to have been set up on the Acropolis in the late 
fifth century (IG I3 506) and by Pausanias’ time there are two: “Health, whom legend calls 
daughter of Asclepius, and (…) Athena, also surnamed Health” (Paus. 1.23.4).36 The cult of 
Hygieia in Athens was connected primarily to Athena Hygieia before the introduction to the 
city of Asclepius in 420 BCE, after which Hygieia became more commonly presented in 
association with this new healer god, as his companion.37 Hygieia is in addition also 
connected to Amphiaraos and according to Pausanias (1.34.3) was represented alongside the 
male healer god on the altar at Oropos.38 What matters here is that Euxenippus, through 
                                               
34 As Hansen (1989), 17 points out, “the two different uses of rhetor in Athens illustrate (…) a gap between the constitution 
and how it works”.  
35 Some have argued that the statue of Health to which Olympias dedicated a cup was not the one on the Acropolis, but one 
which stood in the Amphiareion in Oropos (Paus. 1.34.3 records that Hygieia had a place on the sanctuary’s altar): Stafford 
(2000), 132; Mitchel (1970), 24. Yet this is in contradiction to Hyperides’ explicit placement of the shrine which Olympias 
honoured, as in Athens (Hyp. 4.26). 
36 According to Plutarch this was dedicated by Pericles (Plut. Life of Pericles 13 7.8). 
37 On the history of the cult see Levente (2003), 39-46; Stafford (2005).   
38 See Sineux (2007), 142-147 for discussion of the altar and other evidence for the relationship between Amphiaraos and 
Hygieia. 
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Olympias’ dedication, is connected by this story to the cult of Health. This has led some 
scholars to suggest that Euxenippus either held a priesthood at Athens, or that he was a 
priest of Hygieia at the sanctuary of Oropos itself.39 This latter suggestion is speculative 
though, based only on a dedication found at the Oropian Amphiareion inscribed to Hygieia 
by Euxenippus (SEG 15.291).40 The dating of this dedication to between 338 and 322 BCE makes 
its relative chronology with regards to the incubation case unknown: it is therefore possible 
the dedication is a consequence or result of Euxenippus’ incubation assignment, and the 
inscription therefore cannot be used as evidence for a prior connection to the Amphiareion. 
The story regarding Olympias nevertheless tells us something. As Whitehead states, “his 
‘allowing’ (of Olympias to dedicate) makes it necessary to suppose that Euxenippus was 
acting in some sort of official capacity”.41 Whitehead does not follow through with what this 
means for our understanding of the oracular consultation process, yet this is highly 
suggestive. If Euxenippus held some kind of connection to the cult of Hygieia, might this 
have influenced the Assembly’s selection of him as incubant on behalf of the city at the 
sanctuary at Oropos, where Amphiaraos was closely connected to the cult of Hygieia? Was 
the role of incubant here awarded on the basis of some form of experience, knowledge or 
expertise with regards to a relevant cult? 
This possibility may be further explored by an examination of comparable epigraphic 
evidence. Inscriptions from classical Athens show that on occasion delegates for a religious 
task were chosen for their expertise in such matters, alongside delegates elected by lot. The 
decree concerning Chalkis (IG I3 40) of 446/5 BCE can be taken as a potentially useful parallel 
to our case. This inscription discusses the terms of Athens’ settlement with Chalkis after its 
revolt, and states as one of its demands that “the sacrifices required by the oracles (τὰ δὲ 
ἱερὰ τὰ ἐκ το̑ν χρεσμο̑ν) concerning Euboea are to be carried out as soon as possible by 
Hierokles and three members to be elected from the Council (μετὰ ἱεροκλέος τρε̑ς ἄνδρας, 
ℎὸς ἂν ἕλεται ℎ̣ε βολὲ σφο̑ν αὐτο̑ν)” (64-9).42 This Hierokles is considered the same man who 
as χρησμολόγος (‘expounder of oracles’) makes an appearance in Aristophanes’ Peace (Pax 
1047).43 The Chalkis decree thus appears to appoint a named religious expert, along with 
three others who are unnamed and elected (presumably by lot), to carry out the sacrifices 
required by an oracle.  
In a similar vein, Hyperides’ naming of only Euxenippus could potentially be a 
reflection of the way in which the decree of the Assembly, which would have ordered the 
consultation of Amphiaraos, had appointed members for the incubation party, suggesting 
                                               
39 Priesthood in Athens: Petrakos (1997), 265; Engels (1993), 229. In Oropos: Mitchel (1970), 24. 
40 The inscription reads “Good health. Euxenippus Ethelokratous dedicated (this)”: see Petrakos (1997), 265-267. 
41 Whitehead (2000), 215. Contra Babington (1853), xv. Papazarkadas (2011), 103 calls Euxenippus a “politician”, but does not 
examine the question of his identity or the requirements of fulfilment for the role of incubant. Renberg (2017), similarly 
ignores the issue of the incubants’ identity.  
42 See Meiggs and Lewis (1988), 138-144 for discussion. 
43 Bowden (2003), 266. 
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Euxenippus would have been chosen by name, with the other two elected by lot. This then 
might suggest that Euxenippus was considered an ‘expert’, in a comparable vein to the 
χρησμολόγος in the Chalkis decree.44 Of course, we also know of instances where it is clearly 
stated that all the envoys sent to an oracle were chosen by lot in the same way, without 
anyone singled out as expert. The decree concerning the Sacred Orgas is such an example, 
where the people chosen to deliver the question to the oracle are “three men, one from the 
council and two from all Athenians” (IG II3 1 292, l. 43-44). There is no suggestion of either 
differentiation or expertise here. However, the process used for the oracle consultation in 
this case of the Sacred Orgas is sufficiently different from Euxenippus’ case and plainly does 
not even provide any opportunities at all for a potential need of expert knowledge to 
manifest itself.45  
The paucity of sources recording formal consultations of oracles by Athens means it 
is hard to draw certainties from comparisons, but nonetheless the Chalkis decree raises the 
possibility that Euxenippus could have been chosen specifically for this assignment because 
he was somehow considered authoritative in religious or, more specifically, incubatory 
matters. This hypothesis may be further strengthened by Hyperides letting slip Euxenippus 
was by some means connected to the cult of Hygieia. Either through an official position 
linked to a related cult, or through some form of ‘expertise’, Euxenippus might have been 
consciously selected to incubate in Amphiaraos’ temple. Of course, this hypothesis cannot be 
proven. Furthermore, what exactly such ‘expertise’ might have constituted would be just as 
difficult to determine: even with regard to known roles of ‘religious experts’ who deal with 
divination, such as μάντεις (seers/diviners) and χρησμολόγοι, or religious office holders, 
such as ἐξηγείται (‘expounders’), very little is known of what their actions actually involved 
and thus what form their authority or expertise took.46 Nonetheless, it is important to keep 
this possibility of Euxenippus being a consciously-chosen incubant in mind, as it allows us to 
consider the role of the individual within this collective decision-making process. We will 
come back to this in the analysis of the negotiation of authority which takes place in Athens 
upon the return of the incubation party. Furthermore, who the demos sends to dream on its 
behalf also tells us something about what the demos expects the dream to look like, and what 
the exact role of the dreamer subsequently is, which this next section shall address. 
 
3. The nature of Euxenippus’ dream 
 
                                               
44 It is of course not possible to extrapolate any certainties regarding the relation between Hyperides’ wording here and the 
exact wording of the decree which would have ratified the oracle consultation. 
45 See Bowden (2005), 88-95 for discussion of the procedure using two sealed vases, which resulted in any interpretation of 
and reaction to the oracular answer taking place in front of the ekklesia in Athens, rather than on the envoys’ expedition; 
see also Rhodes and Osborne (2003), 272-281. 
46 See in particular Dillery (2005). 
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After appointment to their mission, Euxenippus and his two companions travelled to Oropos 
to obtain their divine message. A law code discovered at the Oropian Amphiareion, dating to 
387-377 BCE, delineates part of how the process of incubation functioned (I. Oropos 277 = LSCG 
69).47 It regulates the rights and duties of the priest and the warden of the temple (the 
νεωκόρος) as well as the behaviour of worshippers undergoing the process of incubation. 
After paying a fee and offering sacrifice to the god, the incubant’s name and city were 
recorded, and he or she then went to sleep overnight in the temple, hopefully waking up 
with a dream message from the god.48 The rite of incubation was considered a way of 
facilitating a prophetic dream: by sleeping in the god’s temple, and importantly after having 
offered sacrifices to him or her, an individual increased the chances of a god appearing in 
their dream or somehow bestowing on them a divine message.  
What form Euxenippus’ dream might have taken in the case of the disputed Oropian 
hill is unclear. As we have seen, Hyperides simply reports that Euxenippus “tells us that he 
fell asleep and saw a dream” (οὗτος δὲ κοιμηθεὶς ἐνύπνιόν φησιν ἰδεῖν), which he then later 
“reported to the people” (ὃ τῷ δήμῳ ἀπαγγεῖλαι) (Hyp. 4.14). Yet what kind of shape the 
dream might have taken - as experienced by Euxenippus - and how explicitly it might have 
conveyed an answer to the question at hand matters, as it helps us understand the role of 
incubants and the reception of the dream. Were the incubants merely transmitters of a 
simple message, in essence fulfilling the role of a straightforward messenger - similar to 
envoys sent to Delphi for public consultations? Or was the dream ambiguous and in need of 
interpretation, which would raise the crucial question of who held the authority to interpret 
this dream? In order to answer these questions, it will be necessary to attempt to reconstruct 
what the dream, as experienced and reported by Euxenippus, might have been like.  
To do so, we will have to start first of all from what Hyperides tells us about the 
relationship between the dream and the subsequent decree proposal made by Polyeuctus, by 
examining here his narrative in full. He recounts that Euxenippus reported his dream to the 
demos and continues by stating: 
If you assumed, Polyeuctus, that this was true and that he [Euxenippus] reported to 
the people what he actually saw in his sleep, what is his crime in proclaiming to the 
Athenians that which the god had commanded him? If on the other hand, as you say 
now, you thought that he misrepresented the god (καταψεύσασθαι τοῦ θεοῦ) and, out 
of partiality for certain persons, did not report the truth to the people, rather than 
propose a decree disputing the dream (οὐ ψήφισμα ἐχρῆν σε πρὸς τὸ ἐνύπνιον 
γράφειν) you ought to have sent to Delphi, as the previous speaker said, to discover 
the truth from the god. But instead of doing that, you proposed a decree against two 
                                               
47 For the dating see Petropoulou (1981), 55-63. Oropos would have been autonomous at this time. Lupu (2003) argues that 
this is an update and replacement of the earlier sacred law LSCG Suppl. 35.  
48 I. Oropos 277.39-47. On the nature of the sacrifice performed by the incubant, as well as later evidence which describes 
dietary restrictions in the period leading up to incubation, see Sineux (2007), 120-129, 136-148. 
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tribes, entirely conceived by yourself, (ψήφισμα δὲ αὐτοτελὲς ἔγραψας κατὰ δυοῖν 
φυλαῖν), a measure not only most unjust but self-contradictory also (οὐ μόνον 
ἀδικώτατον, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐναντίον αὐτὸ ἑαυτῷ). This was why you were convicted for 
an illegal proposal, not because of Euxenippus (δι᾽ ὅπερ ἥλως παρανόμων, οὐ δι᾽ 
Εὐξένιππον). (Hyp. 4.14-15) 
Polyeuctus, we are told here, proposed a decree πρὸς τὸ ἐνύπνιον. Hyperides postulates 
whether he did so because he accused Euxenippus of lying on account of bribery. Hyperides 
continues by detailing what happened to this decree: 
You proposed that these tribes [of Acamantis and Hippothoontis] should restore the 
mountain to Amphiaraos and the sale price of its produce; on the grounds that the 
fifty boundary officials (τοὺς ὁριστὰς τοὺς πεντήκοντα) had selected it beforehand 
and set it apart for the god, and that the two tribes had no right to be holding it. A 
little later in the same decree you propose that the eight tribes provide compensation 
and pay it to the two tribes so that they are not disadvantaged. But if the mountain 
really belonged to the two tribes and you tried to take it from them, surely we are 
entitled to be angry. Alternatively, if it was held improperly by them and it belonged 
to the god, why were you proposing that the other tribes should pay them money in 
exchange? They should then have been content to restore the property of the god 
without also paying a fine. These proposals, when examined in court, were considered 
not correctly proposed, and the jury voted against you. So if you had been acquitted 
of the charge, Euxenippus here would not have misrepresented the god (οὐκ ἂν 
κατεψεύσατο οὗτος τοῦ θεοῦ), but because you happened to be convicted, must that 
mean ruin for him? (Hyp. 4.16-18) 
Polyeuctus’ decree ordered that the mountain be returned to Amphiaraos, that the tribes of 
Acamantis and Hippothoontis restore to the god “the sale price of its produce” (16), and that 
the other eight tribes should pay Acamantis and Hippothoontis compensation for their loss 
of land, “so that they would not be disadvantaged” (17). Hyperides labels this decree as κατὰ 
δυοῖν φυλαῖν (15), “against the two tribes”. 
If one sets out the various potential outcomes to the question of land allocation, there 
are three possibilities: 
a. the status quo, which would mean the tribes keep the land and the god holds less than 
he otherwise would; 
b. the land is returned to the god and the two tribes are compensated, which means all 
tribes lose something;  
c. the land is returned to the god and there is no compensation, so only the two tribes 
lose out. 
We know that Polyeuctus’ decree proposed solution b. However, what solution the dream 
proposed, i.e. how the dream was understood by Euxenippus, is still not clear: as we have 
seen, Hyperides describes Polyeuctus’ decree as a ψήφισμα πρὸς τὸ ἐνύπνιον (Hyp. 4.15). This 
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phrase is ambiguous with regard to the exact relation between the decree and the dream and 
has been much debated by scholars. Crucially, as David Whitehead notes in his excellent 
commentary of the speech, “all hinges on the sense of the preposition pros in the phrase 
(ψήφισμα) πρὸς τὸ ἐνύπνιον”.49 
 The phrase πρὸς τὸ ἐνύπνιον allows for three interpretive possibilities, as Whitehead 
sets out. The first takes the phrase as meaning (1) “in accordance with the dream”. In this 
sense, the statement would argue that Hyperides’ dream reported that the land was sacred 
and should be assigned to the god. Pierre Sineux subscribes to this line of argument in his 
recent monograph on Amphiaraos, following Gaston Colin and Churchill Babington.50 A 
second possibility understands πρὸς τὸ ἐνύπνιον in (2) the hostile sense, as “disputing the 
dream”. In this view, the assertion would imply the dream was supportive of the claim of the 
two tribes. John Burtt and Mario Marzi have taken this approach.51 A third option renders 
the dream was (3) unclear and that Euxenippus’ report to the Assembly was inconclusive. In 
this last scenario, the ambiguity of the dream - that is, its obscurity of meaning, would allow 
the tribes to understand it as not contesting their right to the land, and would also allow 
Polyeuctus to subsequently contest this interpretation by proposing his decree. Whitehead 
translates the πρὸς τὸ ἐνύπνιον phrase as “based on the dream”, which he suggests allows 
for either the third or the first option.52 
However, if one carefully examines which of these different possibilities fits 
Hyperides’ narrative, and what solution the dream therefore proposed, option 1 (namely, 
that the decree is in accordance with the dream, and that both decree and dream thus assign 
the land to Amphiaraos) can be eliminated. Hyperides, defending Euxenippus, calls the 
decree of Polyeuctus “most unjust” (ἀδικώτατον: Hyp. 4.15), suggesting there must have 
been a discrepancy between his client’s dream and this “most unjust decree”.53 Furthermore, 
Hyperides states that Polyeuctus based his decree proposal on the fact that “fifty boundary 
officials had selected it [the disputed land] beforehand and set it apart from the god” (Hyp. 
4.16) - something which we shall return to. The fact that Polyeuctus brings in new evidence 
here to support his claim implies that he is disputing a previously made claim, i.e. the dream, 
and that the decree and dream are thus in opposition.54 If there is an opposition between 
Polyeuctus’ understanding of the situation and that of Euxenippus, then Euxenippus’ report 
                                               
49 Whitehead (2000), 201. 
50 Babington (1853), 9; Colin (1946), 144; more recently Sineux (2007), 105. 
51 Burtt (1954), 475; Marzi (1977), 178-179; cf. also Cooper (2001), 107; van Lieshout (1980), 176.  
52 Whitehead (2000), 202. Horster (2004) similarly suggests the dream was ambiguous but then claims it was understood as 
in favour of the two tribes: “ (…) Euxenippos berichtete von einem ambiguen Traum, den er gehabt habe, woraufhin die 
Athener beschlossen, daß die beiden Phylen den Berg behalten sollten, da Amphiaraos seine Ansprüche aufgegeben habe” 
(72).  
53 Cf. Marzi (1977), 178. 
54 The date of this drawing of boundaries is uncertain: Colin (1946), 143 states this must have happened much earlier, 
possibly between 377-366, Whitehead (2000), 210 on the contrary argues for a more recent date in the mid-330s: only that 
explains why the dispute arose now and not before. 
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or his interpretation of the dream must have differed from Polyeuctus’ own solution, as 
proposed in the decree.55 We have seen that Polyeuctus’ decree proposed solution b. By 
implication, Euxenippus’ dream then must have advocated either a or c.  
Building on from this, we can consider the fact that Polyeuctus accused Euxenippus 
of acting on behalf of “certain people” (τισι) who bribed him (Hyp. 4.14).56 If the dream 
suggested solution a, the bribers would have to be the tribes who are then advantaged, 
whereas with solution c the bribers would have to be the god, i.e. the god’s sanctuary, as they 
are the only ones who win out in this scenario. However, the god’s sanctuary would win out 
too in Polyeuctus’ supported proposal b, which means that it would make no sense for 
Polyeuctus to make an accusation of bribery against Euxenippus here. Therefore, if 
Euxenippus’ alleged bribers must have been the two tribes, then Euxenippus’ dream must 
have proposed solution a: the tribes keep their land.  
This reasoning by elimination allows us to rule out interpretation (1) of (ψήφισμα) 
πρὸς τὸ ἐνύπνιον, which contends the decree is in accordance with the dream. We are left 
then with options (2) and (3), both of which are plausible:57 either the dream was definitely 
in favour of the claim of the two tribes, or it was experienced as ambiguous by Euxenippus 
and open to interpretation - including by the tribes as in their favour.58 Which of these two 
options seems more likely is a crucial matter. After all, if the dream was experienced by 
Euxenippus as ambiguous, this would create the need for a stage of interpretation before the 
dream could be employed as a decision-making tool in this problem of land ownership. Such 
a need for interpretation would heavily influence the question of where authority lies in this 
decision-making process, and what the function of divination here really is. So far, this paper 
has highlighted the authority of both the Assembly and the individual incubant in the first 
step of consultation. We shall see that, upon return to Athens, there are a number of 
contestations and challenges to the dream, before it can be employed to actually resolve the 
                                               
55 Another potential argument against the proposal that the dream adjudicated in favour of Amphiaraos and Polyeuctus’ 
proposed decree did so too, is that it is then after all hard to explain why Polyeuctus is accusing Euxenippus of 
“misrepresenting the god and not reporting the truth to the people” (15). However, it is unclear whether here Hyperides is 
not speaking only of Polyeuctus’ later impeachment, not the original decree proposal: see later, p. 18-19. 
The fact that Polyeuctus’ decree proposal is judged unlawful (15: παρανόμων) and its proposer punished, while nothing of 
the kind is said about the dream, could be seen also to suggest that the two must be in opposition. However, one could argue 
that possibly the opposition to the proposal was concerned with the second clause of compensation – as Hyperides points 
out (17) this contradicts the first clause assigning the land to the god, as why should the tribes receive compensation if they 
had no right to the land? This is the line of argument Sineux (2007), 105 adopts. However, it is still unlikely that the dream 
came down in favour of the god, taking the remainder of the points in the above paragraph into consideration.  
56 See also Hyp. 4. 39: “For Polyeuctus has impeached Euxenippus for speaking against the best interests of the people of 
Athens, being in receipt of money and gifts from those acting against the people of Athens.” The orator goes on to question 
whether these people are men from inside or outside the city but does not attempt to specify their identity any further. 
57 On the possibility of a divine sign being interpreted as adjudicating against the god’s direct interest, see Horster (2004), 
72. 
58 Whitehead posits that “paragraph 18’s assertion ‘had you been acquitted of the charge, there would have been no 
misrepresentation of the god by Euxenippus here’ does not seem reconcilable with option 2” (Whitehead 2000, 203). This 
however can be refuted, if one understands paragraph 18 in a different sense, see p. 18-19. 
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original conflict. In order to fully understand these contestations, it will be necessary to 
determine whether a dream such as Euxenippus’ could have been experienced as unclear 
and therefore whether a stage of interpretation was necessary: this next section will first 
aim to do so by examining other evidence for divinely-sent dreams in the ancient Greek 
world, before the paper moves on in its final section to the events of the aftermath of the 
divinatory process. 
  
4. Ambiguity in ancient dreaming 
 
In order to understand the nature of Euxenippus’ dream and whether it might have required 
interpretation, contextualisation through comparison with other evidence for the nature of 
ancient dreams seems like an obvious step to take. However, the results of such a comparison 
underscore again the uniqueness of this incubation episode detailed in Hyperides’ speech. 
There are after all practically no comparable literary or epigraphic sources for incubation 
dreams which are divinatory: the only such sources are a few unusual cases of divinatory 
incubation briefly described on the Epidaurian miracle inscriptions, and Herodotus’ story of 
the Persian Mardonius, who sent a man called Mys to consult oracles on his behalf, though 
with what question is not known (Hdt. 8.133-136).59 Mys visited the incubation oracle of 
Amphiaraos, though situated in Thebes at this point rather than in Oropos, and paid a man 
to incubate for him (Hdt. 8.134). While this narrative is interesting for its suggestion that it 
is possible to incubate on behalf of others, it does not tell us anything about the possible 
ambiguity of such dreams, nor about any requirement for interpretation. 
If we move then to consider evidence for other types of dreams, we find the sources 
can be divided into two broad categories. The first consists of reports of incubation dreams 
which are therapeutic: they are alike to our case study in that they are solicited dreams, yet 
differ in the kind of demand they ask of the god. As incubation was most commonly employed 
in the ancient Greek world in its therapeutic form, most sources recording incubation 
dreams concern healing. Inscriptions narrating experiences at the Asclepeion at Epidauros 
dating from the fourth century BCE recount how incubants could wake up from a night in 
Asclepius’ temple wholly cured, or with the knowledge of how a cure might be achieved, 
delivered to them in a dream.60 Literary evidence for incubation ranges from a comedy scene 
                                               
59 While most stories recorded on the Epidaurian inscriptions concern therapeutic matters (see following note), 
there are two instances of divinatory incubation, where the god is asked about the location of treasure and about a 
missing son respectively (IG IV2 1, 123, l. 8-21 and IG IV2 1, 122, l. 19-26). Two other stories also do not concern healing 
but these do not include actual incubation or dreaming: IG IV2 1, 121, l. 79-89 concerns a broken cup and IG IV2 1, 123, l. 
21-29 a broken promise of a donation to Asclepius: see LiDonnici (1995). 
60 IG IV2 1, 121-124. In the majority of the stories narrated on these inscriptions the incubants are cured in the night by the 
god, whom they see in a dream. In a few cases the cure occurs later, after a conversation with the god in the dream (e.g. IG 
IV2 1, 122 l. 26-35, l. 82-86). On these inscriptions see LiDonnici (1995). There are a few cases which report incubation outside 
Epidauros: see e.g. IG IV2 1, 122, l. 10-19 and IG IV2 1, 123, l. 29-33 and see also the evidence collected in Edelstein and Edelstein 
(1945), 208-260 and Girone (1998), 29-39, 75-151.  
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in Aristophanes’ Wealth (633-748) to Aelius Aristides’ Sacred Tales, dating to the second 
century AD, a rich source of information detailing the experience of an incubator at the 
sanctuary of Asclepius in Pergamon.61 In addition, a number of votive reliefs found at 
Amphiaraos’ sanctuary at Oropos present visualisations of the consultant’s experience in the 
case of therapeutic incubation. One example is the relief dedicated by an incubant called 
Archilos, dating from the first half of the fourth century (NM 3369).62 The right hand side of 
the relief shows the incubant asleep, as a snake licks his shoulder in healing, while on the left 
hand side Archilos is depicted again, here being healed by Amphiaraos himself, portrayed as 
a bearded man.63 It thus suggests the belief that in his sleep, Archilos would have direct 
contact with (in this case be healed by) the god himself. The portrayals of the experience 
depicted on these reliefs fit in with the dreams described in the Epidaurian inscriptions, 
which reported conversations with the god and depict dreams as clear, unambiguous and 
direct. It appears that interpretation here was mostly not necessary. However, there are 
some exceptions: Aristides’ descriptions of his incubatory dreams experienced in Pergamon 
include an occasion in which he asks the god to clarify a previously-received dream (Aristid. 
Or. 47.55), which suggests the dream’s meaning had been unclear. Aristides also makes 
frequent reference to his discussions of a dream’s meaning, as he either interprets the divine 
messages himself or asks priests or others for their opinions (Aristid. Or. 47.12, 48.34-35).64 
One testimony inscribed at Epidauros also suggests that an incubation dream could be 
cryptic: the inscription tells of a woman who did not understand an ambiguous dream and 
required the services of a diviner to finally comprehend the god’s message (IG IV2 1, 123, l.8-
21).65 These exceptions demonstrate that incubatory dreaming, while mostly presented as an 
experience which resulted in a straightforward divine answer upon waking, was not always 
necessarily so.  
How useful these accounts of therapeutic incubation are as direct comparisons for 
the nature of Euxenippus’ dream is unclear: while they do indeed describe dreams that 
concern personal matters, Euxenippus’ consultation differed, as he did not seek healing but 
rather knowledge of divine will and, furthermore, for the sake of the collective. A more 
consistent comparison could instead be made with sources concerning non-incubatory 
dreaming, which make up the second broad category of evidence for ancient dreaming. This 
consists of reports of non-incubatory prophetic dreams, i.e. unsolicited dreams. In the 
ancient world, dreams were considered to be potential transmissions of divine messages, 
                                               
61 See Renberg (2017). On Aristides see Petridou (2015), esp. 186-193. 
62 NM 3369: on this and other votive reliefs from Oropos see Petsalis-Diomidis (2006) and also Platt (2011), 44-46, on the way 
in which the relief offers multiple representations both of the god – in different guises - and of the mortal experience with 
the divine.  
63 As Renberg (2017), 272 points out, Amphiaraos is usually depicted in a fashion which closely resembles Asclepius. 
64 See Renberg (2015), who examines the evidence for interpretation of dreams, in particular those which led to religious 
activities, i.e. offerings or dedications. 
65 Renberg (2015), 240-246. 
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similar to other divinatory devices, and these could also appear naturally to someone in their 
sleep, rather than only through incubation. This category is alike to Euxenippus’ case in that 
these dreams are also considered to transmit the will of a deity, yet differ in the context in 
which they are received. As Xenophon states, “the gods know all things, and warn 
(προσημαίνουσιν) whomsoever they will in sacrifices, in omens, in voices, and in dreams” 
(Xen. On the Cavalry Commander 9.9).66 Evidence discussing prophetic dreams is largely literary 
in nature.67 The extant evidence depicts dreams as ambiguous, cryptic signs which require 
interpretation: similar to oracles in some ways, though in their usually unsolicited nature 
they also closely resemble omens. In many of these sources, interpretation is carried out by 
the dreamer him- or herself, or upon consultation with friends of family, as Renberg has also 
demonstrated (see e.g. Hom. Od. 19.535-538; Aristoph. Wasps 42-53; Xen. Anab. 3.1.11-14; 
Theophr. Char. 16.11).68 However, aside from literary accounts of cryptic dreams, which as 
mantic narratives often have particular functions within a story or myth, works such as 
Artemidorus’ Oneirocritica also provide proof that interpretation was often considered 
necessary to make sense of the divine message hidden in one’s sleep – so much so that here 
experts, and their handbooks, were employed especially for this purpose.69   
The broad variety in types of god-sent dreams described in ancient Greek sources, 
and in particular the lack of any useful directly comparable evidence for incubatory 
divinatory dreaming, makes it hard to say anything conclusive about how one can 
understand the nature of the dream as reported by Euxenippus after his night in 
Amphiaraos’ temple. While literary accounts of cryptic dreams and the discussion of dream 
interpretation found in philosophical works and dream handbooks might suggest that 
dreams were often perceived by the dreamer as ambiguous enough to require interpretation, 
it is of course not certain that Euxenippus’ dream would have looked anything like the 
dreams described by Artemidorus. The case of oracles from Delphi, and the discrepancy 
between the depiction of such oracles in literary sources and those attested in epigraphic 
evidence, serves as a warning against making too many assumptions too quickly about the 
nature and form of any divine signs, or the experience of receiving these. Nonetheless, 
epigraphic and literary evidence for the practices of oneiromancy and incubation show that 
prophetic dreams could be considered ambiguous and unclear by the dreamer, and require 
                                               
66 For discussion see Mikalson (1983), 39-40. For recent studies on attitudes to dreams, and discussion of ancient sources 
concerning dreams see Harris (2009); Näf (2004). On incubation see also Dodds (1951), 102-134. 
67 For examples of prophetic dreams see tragedy (eg. Eur. IT 1264-5; Aesch. Coeph. 527-535) or comedy (Aristoph. Wasps 24,25; 
Menander Dyskolos 402-426), the exaggerated portrayal of a Superstitious Man (δεισῐδαίμων) by Theophrastus (Char. 16), or 
the analysis and classification of prophetic dreams by Aristotle in his On Divination through Sleep. Xenophon provides 
numerous historical examples of the attention awarded to dreams (see e.g. Anab. 3.1.11-12; 4.3.8-9; 6.1.20-24) and as such is 
a highly useful source for the belief in prophetic dreams. See also Plato’s TImaeus 71e-72a, which presents some dreaming 
as a method of divination which requires interpretation. 
68 See Renberg (2015). 
69 Though dated to the second century CE, Artemidorus’ handbook of dream analysis was most likely not the earliest of its 
kind, just the earliest surviving one.  
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interpretation. Hyperides says that “Euxenippus notified the Athenians of the commands 
which the god gave him” (ἃ ὁ θεὸς αὐτῷ προσέταττε ταῦτ᾽) (Hyp. 4.14). We might assume 
therefore that ambiguity could have characterised Euxenippus’ dream too, and that it could 
have been in need of interpretation by Euxenippus himself, or upon his return to Athens. 
 
5. The aftermath: interpretation and contestation  
 
A comparison with other sources for prophetic dreams in the Greek world cannot provide a 
conclusive answer to the question of the nature of the dream, the possibility of ambiguity 
and the subsequent need for a stage of interpretation. It showed, nonetheless, that this latter 
notion was a possibility at least. Additionally, analysis of the final stage of the incubatory 
process, the aftermath of the dream, demonstrates that there was contestation of what had 
gone before. This next section examines the aftermath of the incubation process, in which 
different people contest the dream, its transmission and interpretation. This will, as we shall 
see, allow us to suggest that an ambiguous dream would have been more likely, and will let 
us conclude with a final scrutiny of where the authority in this decision-making process lies. 
As we have seen, after Euxenippus reported his dream to the Assembly, Polyeuctus 
became involved in the divination process by initiating two different actions. Both of these 
contest and challenge elements of the process which had gone before: Hyperides’ speech is 
the result of Polyeuctus’ impeachment of the principal incubant for bribery, as Polyeuctus 
called into question the veracity of Euxenippus’ dream report by accusing him of 
misrepresenting the god – thereby questioning the transmission stage of the decision-
making process. Before that, however, Polyeuctus first proposed a decree declaring the hill 
belonged to the deity.70 We have seen that this decree proposal was in opposition to the 
dream. It is, therefore, also an attempt at contesting what had gone before, regardless of the 
fact that the proposal was eventually declared illegal. What element of the consultation 
process exactly this proposed decree contested is, again, unclear: was it the transmission, i.e. 
the veracity of Euxenippus’ report, as Polyeuctus contested later through the impeachment? 
Or was it rather the interpretation of the dream? Understanding what the basis of 
Polyeuctus’ intervention was will illuminate, firstly, whether it is possible that the dream 
was ambiguous, and secondly, the role of individuals in influencing this collective decision-
making. 
While it would seem most obvious that Polyeuctus’ decree questioned the same stage 
of the process as he did in his later εἰσαγγελία for bribery, if one carefully looks at Hyperides’ 
                                               
70 Hyperides also describes the decree as a ψήφισμα αὐτοτελὲς.  This phrase could be a simple non-technical description, 
conveying a sense that Polyeuctus ‘acted arbitrarily’ or ‘on his own initiative’ in making this proposal, or it could be taken 
in a technical sense, explaining that Polyeuctus proposed the decree in response to the report of Euxenippus in the ekklesia, 
without prior planning, and thus without presenting it to the boule for inspection first, as would have been the normal 
procedure. Whitehead (2000), 205 understands the phrase in the former meaning; Cooper (2001), 107 takes the latter 
approach, although he does not accept this without reservations. 
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words this does not seem to be the case. Hyperides namely implies that the two actions by 
Polyeuctus did not involve the same elements and that the decree was instead questioning 
something different, as he says: “If on the other hand, as you now maintain (ὥσπερ νυνὶ 
λέγεις), you thought that he misrepresented the god and, out of partiality for certain 
persons, had made a false report to the people, rather than propose a decree disputing the 
dream you ought to have sent to Delphi, as the previous speaker said, and inquired the truth 
from the god” (Hyp. 4. 15). Hyperides here hypothetically assigns as Polyeuctus’ motive for 
proposing the decree the same motive he gives for bringing the εἰσαγγελία, yet the temporal 
parenthesis ὥσπερ νυνὶ λέγεις implies this is not necessarily the case and suggests he might 
have said something different ‘then’ from ‘now’.71  
This differentiation is suggested too a few sentences later in the speech, where 
Hyperides calls Polyeuctus’ decree “most unjust and self-contradictory also. This was what 
caused your conviction for illegal proposals. It was not the fault of Euxenippus” (Hyp. 4.15). 
Hyperides here unsurprisingly denounces Polyeuctus’ decree in strong terms, calling it 
unjust and inconsistent. His claim that Polyeuctus’ conviction was “not the fault of 
Euxenippus” is evidently rhetorical too, but nonetheless, the fact he can make such a claim 
suggests that it would be plausible to his audience to declare that Euxenippus had nothing 
to do with the decree and its conviction as unlawful. Furthermore, Hyperides says something 
telling about the condemnation of Polyeuctus for bringing an illegal proposal: “These 
proposals, when examined in court, were considered unsatisfactory, and the jury 
condemned you. So if you had been acquitted in your trial, Euxenippus would not have 
misrepresented the god: because you happened to be convicted, must ruin fall on him?” (18). 
This passage can be interpreted as saying that if Polyeuctus had not been convicted (of 
bringing an illegal proposal) Euxenippus would not have been accused of misrepresenting 
the god: therefore if the decree had been passed, Euxenippus would not have stood accused.72 
It is only because Polyeuctus was convicted that he then brought the εἰσαγγελία, and with it 
the charge against Euxenippus. Therefore, the decree could not have been based on an 
accusation of Euxenippus as misrepresenting the god, and thus must have brought into 
question something other than the transmission of the dream. It did not accuse Euxenippus 
of lying, yet it proposed a solution different from Euxenippus’ report. This suggest then that 
one should understand Euxenippus’ report of his dream (or its discussion in the Assembly) 
and Polyeuctus’ proposed decree as competing interpretations of the dream, which each 
suggested different solutions to the problem of land ownership. The dream, then, might very 
possibly have been experienced by its human dreamer as an ambiguous, unclear message 
from the god.  
                                               
71 Whitehead (2000), 202 recognises this undercutting parenthesis but does not go into its possible implications. 
72 Contra Whitehead (2000), 203. He interprets this passage as irreconcilable with the interpretation that Polyeuctus’ decree 
is “opposing the dream”. But if understood as above, this passage does not have to be incompatible with that interpretation. 
See also earlier. 
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What Polyeuctus’ decree thus questioned is the interpretation of the divine sign, and 
he does this through the mechanism of a decree proposal, based on the evidence of boundary 
officials: “(…) your reason being that the fifty boundary officials (τοὺς ὁριστὰς τοὺς 
πεντήκοντα) had selected it beforehand and set it apart for the god, and that the two tribes 
had no right to be holding it” (16).73 The reasons why this previous allotment of the land by 
boundary officials would have been ignored when the land was more recently divided up 
amongst the ten tribes is uncertain: possibly it had been forgotten or overridden for some 
other reason.74 In any case this argument does not appear to have convinced the judges in 
the case against Polyeuctus’ illegal proposal. Polyeuctus’ attempt to question the 
interpretation of the gods’ message by human law and by reference to an earlier land 
allotment decision made by officials nominated for the task by the polis, is criticised by 
Hyperides: he argues Polyeuctus should have instead “sent to Delphi, as the previous speaker 
said, and inquired the truth from the god” (εἰς Δελφοὺς πέμψαντα πυθέσθαι παρὰ τοῦ θεοῦ 
τὴν ἀλήθειαν) (Hyp. 4.15). Hyperides makes recourse here to yet another source of authority: 
Apollo’s oracle at Delphi. Hyperides, making use of an argument rhetorically useful for his 
denunciation of Polyeuctus, suggests thus that only another god, not a mortal using human 
law, can provide the truth (ἀλήθεια) regarding Amphiaraos’ message. In the sentence just 
above this, Polyeuctus’ εἰσαγγελία is described as an accusation of “misrepresentation of the 
god” (καταψεύσασθαι τοῦ θεοῦ) and “not reporting the truth to the people” (15: μὴ τἀληθῆ 
ἀπηγγελκέναι τῷ δήμῳ).  With this juxtaposition of ἀλήθεια Hyperides makes a point about 
the hypocrisy of Polyeuctus: while Polyeuctus accuses Euxenippus of lying, Polyeuctus 
himself did not take the right decision to seek the truth either. Evidently there is a strong 
and obvious rhetorical element to Hyperides’ argument here: he is attempting to portray 
Polyeuctus’ actions as conceited (and even impious), thinking his own opinion more valid 
than the god’s. Hyperides attempts to downplay the relevance and power of transient human 
constructs such as decrees, in comparison with the expressions of divine will found in 
dreams and oracles.75 These different arguments show the complexity of discussing religious 
authority in the legal and democratic setting of this speech. 
 
6. Conclusion 
 
In this matter of recognising land as potentially sacred, authority in the decision-making 
process thus exists on different levels. Just as the demos ordered Euxenippus to incubate, so 
too does the god order him to report the message back to the Athenians, thereby 
                                               
73 Papazarkadas (2011), 47 suggests the marking out of sacred land by fifty horistai should be seen as part of the Athenians’ 
reorganisation of the cult upon their reacquisition of Oropos. 
74 When exactly these boundary officials demarcated the land is uncertain: Whitehead (2000), 209-211 proposes a date after 
335 BC; Papazarkadas (2011), 45 suggests 335-332 BC.  
75 Compare Xen. Hell. 7.1.27, who criticises the Thebans and Spartans for not consulting the god about how to bring about 
peace, instead deliberating about it themselves. 
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transmitting the will of the god. Euxenippus’ apparent connection to Hygieia suggests his 
selection as incubant could have been a conscious and deliberate choice. Although one 
cannot be certain whether religious expertise of some sort would have definitely impacted 
this selection, this possibility highlights in any case the need to reflect on the exact role 
Euxenippus played in this process. Hyperides claims that only a god can give an authoritative 
judgement. But as the dream Euxenippus received appears unclear in its suggested course of 
action, in practice evidently some human agent did have to interpret it – whether the 
Assembly did so explicitly when faced with Euxenippus’ report, or the tribes implicitly did 
so in taking the dream as a judgement on their right. Furthermore, even though Hyperides 
criticises him for these contestations, Polyeuctus could twice present a challenge to part of 
the decision-making process. First, he proposed a decree challenging the interpretation of 
the dream as presented by Euxenippus to the Assembly (although his decree was not enacted 
and became discredited, the fact that he proposed it in the first place is interesting), which 
suggests it is evidently possible for an individual to personally present a challenge to a dream 
interpretation and to suggest a contrary one.76 Secondly, he brought a court case which 
challenged the accuracy of Euxenippus’ transmission of the dream. The authority to provide 
an answer to the question at the heart of this case or an interpretation of a divine sign is thus 
held by different figures: ostensibly by gods, in reality by the Assembly, most likely strongly 
based on an ‘expert’ ambassador to the oracle, and even by individuals.   
Despite this appearance of a sequence of diverse authoritative acts, however, it is 
important to note the actual nature of individuals’ authority in this oracular process. While 
the incubation rite is governed by many steps and consequently leaves room for individual 
agency, as we have seen in Euxenippus’ and Polyeuctus’ actions, this individual agency 
remains rather circumscribed: in the end, despite not advertising direct influence on 
decisions, it is the Assembly which nonetheless legitimises the decisions of individual agents.  
Hyperides’ In Defence of Euxenippus can thus be understood as a speech which 
illustrates the intricacy of the consultation of a god through incubation, as a process made 
up of a number of different stages in which human fallibility complicates the transmission 
of divine will from its expression in a dream through to human understanding of this will. 
This is especially complex for consultations made by a community, rather than an individual, 
where, as this case illustrates, a dichotomy can appear between the singularity of a normal 
individual who has direct and unmediated contact with the god, and the interpretation of 
this divine contact in the interests of his whole community.77 As such, it is maybe not 
surprising that this case appears to be unique. While not unusual per se, the speech’s lack of 
religious argumentation and Hyperides’ focus on procedural elements of the case, which are 
                                               
76 The negligible fine which Polyeuctus received upon conviction indicates in any case that his decree proposal was not 
completely unacceptable or particularly unusual. The fact also that Polyeuctus’ decree argued that the land should belong 
to the god, rather than mortals, might have made this more easily acceptable.  
77 Sineux (2007), 219. 
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in all likelihood influenced by the speech’s nature as a συνηγορία, should also be understood 
in light of the complexity of balancing a standard presentation of the nomoi of the city, as 
well as the judgement of the demos, as authoritative, with Hyperides’ attempt to downplay 
the relevance and power of transient human constructs such as decrees, in comparison with 
the expressions of divine will found in dreams and oracles. This is of course evidently a 
rhetorical argument which contradicts the authority invested in the Athenian demos firstly 
to decide on a manner of action concerning the dispute of the sacredness of the land, 
secondly to appoint Euxenippus as transmitter of the divine message, and thirdly to play a 
role in the disputed interpretation of the oracle. The interaction with (and message from) 
the god is governed by many steps: the choice of individual for the incubation process, his 
reception of a dream, and the community’s acceptance and interpretation (or acceptance of 
the interpretation) of it. The process of transforming the dream into an understanding of 
divine will can be challenging, as well as open to challenges. 
A final point to consider is how the oracular occasion narrated by Hyperides fits in 
with the general picture of the role of oracles in fourth-century Athenian society. This paper 
has demonstrated that, as an unusually informative illustration of the problems we face 
interpreting the working of, motivation behind and attitudes toward oracular consultation, 
Hyperides’ speech deserves more attention, and the Amphiareion at Oropos merits a place 
alongside the oracles of Delphi and Dodona as sources for this process. While recent 
scholarship has looked at divination either as a regulatory device, employed to create 
consensus in situations where this is lacking, or as a way of dealing with situations of high 
risk for which human problem-solving could not provide an answer, this case study of the 
Oropian hill queries the idea that divination is necessarily consensus-building. Here, 
consulting the oracle does not ‘solve’ the problem, nor does it simplify the decision-making 
process. Rather, this case highlights the function of divination as a structuring device. It 
frames the way in which the resolution of a conflict can be approached, not necessarily 
simplifying the process, nor guaranteeing a simple and consensual solution, but instead 
structuring how a solution may be worked towards. Divination does so through the use of a 
complex procedure, which involves ritual elements and allows individual agency through 
particular assigned roles, though these remain to a large extent instruments of 
circumscribed procedure, which is ultimately legitimised by the Assembly. Nonetheless, 
some room for individual agency remains.  The divinatory process is after all complicated by 
its need for both transmission and interpretation, both of which are open to contestation. 
Consulting the oracle is therefore only one – if serious – step in the decision-making process, 
which necessitates also interpretation and debate.78  
                                               
78 I presented an earlier draft of this article at the Max Weber Centre for Advanced Social and Cultural Studies in Erfurt 
and I would like to thank all the participants of the colloquium for their stimulating comments, in particular Jörg Rüpke 
and Richard Gordon.  I am grateful to Paul Michael Kurtz for his insightful feedback on a subsequent draft of this work, 
and to the two anonymous reviewers for their helpful critique. This work was supported by a studentship from the Arts 
and Humanities Research Council UK, as well as by a visiting fellowship at the Max Weber Centre. 
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